Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit by Resnik, Judith
HeinOnline -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 835 1996-1997
Litigating and Settling Class Actions:
The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit
Judith Resnik:*
I. THE IMAGES THAT FRAME THIS CONVERSATION
john Oakley has entitled the panel discussion, and now this
symposium, "Summing Up Procedural Justice: Exploring the Tension
Between Collective Processes and Individual Rights in the Context of
Settlement and Litigating Classes." Under this rubric we could be
discussing an array of topics, but given that this conversation
,takes place in the winter of 1997 among a group of
proceduralists, our attention has been drawn by proposed revi-
sions to the 1966 class action rule! and by pending and vivid
case law examples (including Georgine,2 Ahearn, g and GM
• © Copyright 1997 Judith Resnik and the Regents of the University of California.
Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. VISiting
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, 1996-97; as ofJuly I, 1997, Arthur
Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
This essay is written at the prompting ofJohn Oakley, who assembled a panel inJanu-
ary of 1997 to discuss class litigation and is informed by the exchanges with co-panelists
John Oakley, Eric Green, and Sam Issacharoff. My thanks also to Janet Alexander, Margaret
Berger, Richard Bieder, Elizabeth Cabraser, Jack Coffee, Denny Curtis, Owen Fiss, John
Frank, Deborah Hensler, and Nancy Morawetz for ongoing conversations about the scope,
shape, and utility of large-scale litigation and to Alys Brehio and Jennifer Rakstad for ongo-
ing assistance in understanding the current shape of the doctrine.
I See Proposed Rules: Amendments to the Federal Rules, Proposed Amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 23. Class Actions, 167 F.RD. 523, 559-66 (1996) [hereinafter
Proposed Rule 23].
• Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3m Cir.), aJld sub nom. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). The case was argued on February 18, 1997
but, as of this writing, had not yet been decided. SeeJudith Resnik, Postscript: The Import oj
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 881 (1997).
• Now known as •In re AsMtos Litigation," 90 F.3d 963, reh'g tknied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th
Cir. 1996), petitions JOT arlo filed sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, No. 96-1379, 65 LW 3611
(Mar. 11, 1997) (challenging the decision not to disqualify the trial judge who approved
the settlement in which he had been involved in the negotiations, as well as contesting the
mandatory nature of the class) and sub nom Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 96-1394, 65
U.S.L.W. 3631 (Mar. 18, 1997) (challenging the certification that provided for a mandato-
ry, non-Qpt out class under Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B». See 65 LW 3638 (Mar. 18, 1997).
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Trucks 4) of class action practice, doctrine, and aspirations.5
The issues come packaged under headings like "futures class-
es" and "settlement classes" and the controversy has become
heated - with accusations of collusion, attorney self-interest,
and judicial acquiescence in or support of unfair settlements.6
In this heat, issues become conflated that need to be disentan-
gled; examples stemming from cases claimed to be typical may
themselves be only a part of a diverse and variable lot.
Neither rulemaking nor commentary on procedure should be
driven by that which grabs attention unless we can be confident
that the vivid example is paradigmatic of the set. Thus, while I
share concerns about the equity and quality of certain class
action (and other) settlements and about the processes that
generate them, I am also concerned about a reaction to these
instances that disables class action litigation rather than attempt-
ing to constrain particular distressing manifestations.
II. THE EXPECTED COURSE OF LmGATION,
CIRCA 1990s: SOME DATA
Both the practice of litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are shaped today by an understanding that the act of
filing a lawsuit does not constitute a statement of intention to try
a lawsuit. Not only do litigants and lawyers begin most lawsuits
with little expectation of trial, but judges and rulemakers also
encourage them to try hard not to go to trial, and they do so
through rules, doctrine, and practices.7
• In" General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768
(3rd Cir.), art. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
5 Here, teachers of civil procedure owe special thanks to Tom Rowe, a member of the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules. Via a civil procedure and federal courts "listselV,"
Professor Rowe disseminates information on the activities of the Rules Committee and on
pending cases of import. Hence, as of May 5, 1997, we alileamed that the Advisory Com-
mittee decided to defer consideration of the question of settlement classes until October
and to send forward two of the proposed revisions circulated; the Committee proposes
changing Rule 23(c)(1) to revise the mandate to certify "as soon as practicable" with a
permissive "when" and to add a subsection (f) to provide for discretionary interlocutory
appeals of class action certification decisions by district judges. Tom Rowe e-mail of May 5,
1997 (on file with the author).
6 See generaUy the exchanges in Symposium, Mass Tcn1es: Serving Up Just Desserts, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 811 passim (1995).
7 See generallyJudith Resnik, WhoseJudgmmt? VacatingJudgmmts, Prefermas fur Settlement,
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Revisions to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules, local rules in many
districts, and the Civil Justice Refonn Act all call for judges to
control litigation and, if possible, to help create conditions un-
der which settlement can occur.8 Take for example a local rule
in the district of Massachusetts, which reads that:
At every conference conducted under these rules, the judicial
officer shall inquire as to the utility of the parties conducting
settlement negotiations, explore means of facilitating those
negotiations, and offer whatever assistance may be appropri-
ate in the circumstances.9
Similarly, the Eastern District of New York's local rules oblige
judges at the mandatory Rule 16 conference to explore "the
feasibility of settlement or invoking alternative dispute resolution
procedures, such as the Use of settlement judges, early neutral
evaluation, and mediation." 10 Thus, over the past few decades,
judges have shifted roles, becoming "managerial judges," 11 "set-
tlement judges," and one of many "players" around a bargaining
table. 12
and the Role ofAdjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L REv. 1471 (1994);
Samuel R Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settk-
men/, 44 UCLA L REv. 1 (1996); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994). For a discussion of
settlement efforts in federal bankruptcy courts and in state courts, see Anne M. Burr, Build-
ing Refurm from the Hattom Up: Furmulating Local Rules for Bankntplcj Court-Annexed Mediation,
12 OHIOj. DlsP. REs. 311 (1997), and Milton Heumann &Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation
Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jmey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want",
12 OHIO j. DISP. REs. 253 (1997).
• See the 1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 16; the Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990,
28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct 873 (1996).
See grmeraUy Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Cansequenus of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REv. 631; Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudgr!S. 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982).
• U.S. DIST. CT. RULES, D. MAss. Expense and' Delay Reduction Rule 4.02 (West's
Mass. Rules of Court, Jan. 15, 1997).
10 N.Y. RULES OF COURT, E.D.N.Y. Rules of the Eastern District of New York, Civil Jus-
tice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan II(F)(5)(ix) (West, Dec. I, 1996).
" Resnik, ManagerialJudgt;, supra note 8.
.. Judith Resnik, Procedural Innovations, Sloshing Over: A Comment on Deborah Hensler, A
Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Pmonal
Injury Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1627, 1630 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of
Mass Torts for judges, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1821 (1995). Some of what that "play" entails (ranging
from meetings in courts to joining the judge at his home) can be found in the descriptions
of the settlement process in both the majority and dissents in In re Asbestos Litigation, 90
F.3d 963, 971, reh'g denied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), petitions for cert. filed sub nom.
Flanagan v. Aheam, No. 96-1379, 65 LW 3611 (Mar. 11, 1997) (challenging the decision
not to disqualify the trial judge who approved the settlement in which he had been in-
HeinOnline -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 838 1996-1997
838 "University of California, Davis [Vol. 30:835
Rules, statutes, and practice are not the only sources for the
proposition that the procedural system is aimed at dispositions
without trial. The case law is similarly emphatic on this point. A
phrase that has found its way into a few published cases is that
"a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial." 13
Further, the judicial policy favoring settlements is said to have
special force in the class action context.14 And the 1996 deci-
sion by the United States Supreme Court in Matsushita provides
further illustration of the commitment to the policy of settle-
ment, for the case holds that state courts may have jurisdiction
to approve settlements of lawsuits that they lack jurisdiction to
try. 15
Given the many variables that affect decisions to go to trial,
the contribution made by these rules and policies to the declin-
volved in the negotiations, as well as contesting the mandatory nature of the class) and sub
nom Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. No. 96-1394, 65 U.S.LW. 3631 (Mar. 18, 1997) (challenging
the certification that provided for a mandatory, non-opt out class under FED. R CW. P.
23(b)(I)(B». See 65 LW 3638 (Mar. 18, 1997).
" In Tf Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.O.N.Y. 1985),
aJfd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); Weiss v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 899 F. Supp. 1297,
1301 (O.NJ. 1995) (quoting In Tf Wamer, noting that courts have "often stated" this view,
and approving as fair a "coupon" settlement in which owners of luxury cars received certifi-
cates of varying thousand dollar values), aJfd 66 F.3d 314 (3rd Cir. 1995) (table).
Ii See, e.g., Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265, 1275 (Ala. 1995) (citing federal law
for the proposition that the "judicial policy favoring settlement is particularly important in
the context of class actions"), art. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), em. dismis.sed as impruuidently
granted, II7 S. Ct. 1028 (1997); see also Armstrong v. Board of Sch. Directors, 616 F.2d 305,
312 (7th Cir. 1980) ("It is axiomatic that the federal courts look with great favor upon the
voluntary resolution of litigation through settlement.").
The congressional attitude toward settlement has recently become more complex. The
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-134, IIO
Stat. 1321 (to be codified at various titles), affects consent decrees in prison conditions
litigation in a fashion that undermines incentives to enter them. Specifically, Congress has
provided that prospective relief in consent decrees involving prison conditions terminate
absent findings that the relief was "narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right and is the least intrusive means necessary to cor-
rect the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)
(providing for automatic stays of consent decrees if motions to invalidate them are filed).
Courts have disagreed about the constitutionality of these provisions. See, e.g., Plyer v.
Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding the PLRA's provisions relating to consent
decrees); Gavin v. Ray, Civ. No. 4-78-CV-70062, 1996 WL 622556 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 18, 1996)
(finding PRLA provisions about termination of consent decrees to be unconstitutional);
Hadix v.Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.O. Mich. 1996) (finding that automatic stay provi-
sions unconstitutionally reopened final judgments); Benjamin v.Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332
(S.O.N.Y. 1996) (provisions terminating consent decrees constitutional).
15 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, II6 S. Ct. 873, 878 (1996).
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ing rate of trials cannot be specified, but the fact of the rarity
of trials can. With the help of Stephen Yeazell, we know that
trial rates have declined from about twenty percent of the feder-
al civil caseload in 1938 to under five percent in the 1990s.16
(In 1995, the percentage of civil cases going to trial in the fed-
eral courts was just above three percent.17)
While commentators sometimes equate a low trial rate with a
high settlement rate, it is erroneous to deduce a settlement rate
of ninety-five percent from the trial rate of under five percent.
Within the ninety-five percent of cases not tried, a significant
proportion involve some form of adjudication other than trial.
Estimates are that in about a third of the pending cases, judges
decide contested motions such as motions to dismiss, prelimi-
nary injunctions, and summary judgment. IS Thus, my point is
not that the federal courts do not adjudicate but, rather, that
trials are a rare form of adjudication.19
Turning again to the specific subset of litigation that is our
focus (class actions and other large-scale cases), the fact that a
case is processed in the aggregate (by class action, multi-district
litigation, or other mechanism) does not appear to vary these
propositions. Be it two-party or multi-party litigation, trial re-
mains the odd form of disposition while adjudications other
than trial remain frequent. While empiricism on class actions is
very limited,20 we have recent and welcome data from Thomas
Willging's, Laural Hooper's, and Robert Niemic's study for the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC).21 They reviewed filings in four
16 Yeazell, supra note 8, at 633.
17 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 36, tbl.C-4 (Dec. 31, 1995) (reporting that 3.2% of civil cases reached
trial).
18 Yeazell, supra note 8, at 636 nn.I8-19.
19 Again, Professor Yeazell has provided an important picture: that in "1938, 63% of
the adjudicated terminations of civil cases were trials and directed verdicts. In 1990, trials
accounted for only II % of all adjudications; the remainder were disposed of before trial."
Iii at 636 (footnotes omitted).
20 Additional information will become available when RAND's ICj completes an ongo-
ing project on class action practice; data collection is under way on the study of class ac-
tions in 1995-96 in both state and federal courts. See Deborah R Hensler, jennifer Gross,
Erik Moller, & Nicholas Pace, Preliminary &suus of the RAND Study of Class Action Litigation,
Documented Briefing, May, 1997 (on file with the author) [hereinafter RANIYs Class Action
Study].
21 Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper, & Robert]. Niemec, An Empirical Analysis of
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districts22 and learned that (at least in those districts) settle-
ment rates in class actions were generally comparable to settle-
ment rates in other civil cases.23 Turning to the question of
trial, in three of the four districts studied, the trial rate was
similar (ranging from three to six percent) to that of non-elass-
action litigation.24 And, in terms of non-trial adjudication, in
about two-thirds of the class actions certified, judges made sub-
stantive rulings on contested motions.25
Lawyers commencing cases and judges presiding over them
know these rules, these practices, the case law, and the odds.
The shared understanding is that commencing a lawsuit is a
plan to litigate or to settle a case but is rarely a plan to try a
case. Further, those seeking trial will be met by a rule regime
that is suspicious of the activity; both individual and class litiga-
tion is handled with a strong presumption against trial.
III. CLASS ACTION STATUS: ALTERING1'HIS COURSE?
The predicate question for me is whether class actions should
be pennitted to be commenced with an assumption parallel to
that of individual litigation - that trial is unlikely and perhaps
implausible. Or, should the price of certification be that in class
Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking ChalImges, 71 N.V.U. L. REv. 74,92 (1996) [hereinafter FJG
Glass Action Study]. The authors remind us to attend to the problems of data collection,
both their own and those of other sources. A central caveat is that the FJC study was based
on an intensive inquiry into four district courts, but cannot tell us whether those courts are
representative of class action litigation as a whole. Further, because of the rapid change in
practice in the last few years, data from even the early 1990s may not capture activity in the
late 1990s.
22 Specifically, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of Florida, the
Northern District of lliinois and the Northern District of California. Iii at 82.
23 Iii at 92, 182 fig.2. The researchers also remind us to take care about the differing
modes of collection of data; their information comes from case files while the data about
non-i:lass actions comes from the Administrative Office (AO) of the United States Courts,
which codes dispositions under categories such as "dismissed: settled," "dismissed: voluntari-
ly," and "judgment on consent," but does not review individual files. Iii at 92 n.63. When
the researchers looked at such files in four districts, they found rates of class actions differ-
ent from those reported by the AO. Thus, when comparing AO data on non-class actions
with the FJC Class Action Study data on class actions, one is relying on two different data
sources and hence, differences in settlement rates, in substantive adjudication, and in trial
rates "may simply reflect the differences in data collection methods." Iii
.. Iii at 92, 151 (excluding prisoner civil cases). In the fourth district, class action trials
were 5.5% and non-class action civil trial rates were 3.2%.
25 Iii at 109-10.
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actions, unlike other civil cases, lawyers have to demonstrate the
ability to bring cases to trial?
One response is to argue that the distinctive features of class
actions (and specifically their representative structure on behalf
of absentees26) mandate different rules; for those who seek au-
thorization from a court to function in a representative capacity,
the hurdles should be higher, including a demonstration of the
ability to proceed to trial at the time of certification. While this
formulation has appeal, I disagree with it for several reasons.
First, I think that ~uch a requirement limits access to courts. I
worry that demanding the capacity to try a class could function
like the Eisen T7 requirements to. preclude the litigation of meri-
torious claims.28 Recall in Eisen that to fulfill the obligations im-
posed by the Supreme Court's reading of Rule 23(b)(3), the
named plaintiff proposing the class action had to provide indi-
vidual notice at the time of certification to so large a circle of
potential class members that the case (already found likely to
succeed on the merits29 ) could not proceed. Similarly, if class
counsel is required to 'establish as a predicate to certification
that the lawsuit could be tried, meritorious lawsuits· might fail
that test, even though they might - had certification been
granted - have proceeded to some form of adjudication or
settlement.
Second, I am opposed to imposing this burden on class ac-
tions because it will create incentives to litigate cases under
other aggregate rubrics that· may provide fewer safeguards to
absentees than do class actions. Class actions are but one form
of grouping claims. Aggregate litigation has increased (on both
the civil and criminal sides) over the past decades in frequency
and appears under a variety of headings, including but not limit-
ed to class actions.
26 See Samuel Issacharoff. Class Action Conflicts, 30 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 805, 805-08
(1997).
27 Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin. 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974).
28 For commentary exploring the burdens thus imposed, see Kenneth W. Dam, Class
Action Notice: Who Needs It? 1974 SUP. Cr. REv. 97; Owen M. Fiss. The Political ThMry of the
Class Action, 53 WASHINGTON & LEE L. REv. 21 (1996).
.. See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 54 F.RD. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that the
plaintiffs were "more than likely· to prevail).
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Given the array of interests promoting aggregate litigation,
trial judges and inventive lawyers are fully able to form aggre-
gate lawsuits via means other than class actions, such as the
multi-district litigation process, consolidation, informal aggrega-
tions via uniform pretrial orders, the assignment of special mas-
ters, and of course, bankruptcy.!lO If federal rulemakers or
courts impose a rigid requirement that a class cannot be certi-
fied without evidence of the ability to take that configuration to
trial, such cases often will neither die nor revert to single-case
processing, but will instead be processed in the aggregate, either
informally or via some other process.!l1
Further, federal class action law is not the only venue for class
action practice; state courts are an important site of class action
activity. The language of class action practice now includes terms
like "portable" classes and "migration" to capture the point that
cases rejected in the federal courts move to the state courts and
proceed, in the aggregate, to judgment.!l2 Absent a United
.. See, e.g.,Judith Resnik, From "ea.w" to "Litigation", 54 L & CONfEMP. PROBS. 5, 21-37
(Summer, 1991).
.. While the last few years have brought forth appellate concern about these innova-
tions, those restraints have not precluded a robust practice in collective litigation. See, e.g.,
In Ttl Rhone-Poulanc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.) (mandamus ordering decertifica-
tion of a class action, involving allegations of tainted blood to hemophiliacs, in part on the
grounds that by collectivity, undue pressures to settle flowed), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995). Following that decertification, however, a group of hemophiliac recipients of blood
transfusions who argued that the blood exposed them to HIV infections have proceeded to
settle (albeit controversially) as a collective. In Ttl Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood
Prods. Litig., MDlr986, N.D. lIl. May 8, 1997 (on file with author). See Darryl Van Ouch,
Vzctims of Hemophilia and Delay: Two Camps Battle for Money and Justice Oller Blood Products
Containing HIV Vims, 19 NAT. LJ., Oct. 7, 1996, at AI; Four Drug Companies Ordered to Pay
Hemophilitus, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1997, at 012 (describing district court approval of a settle-
ment fund of $670 million, with payments of $100,000 to six thousand hemophiliacs, and
comparing it to a settlement in Japan with payments of $450,000 per person; noting that
about 550 hemophiliacs opted out and could pursue individual litigation).
Sam Issacharoff finds it "ironic" that the case proceeded toward a nationwide settle-
ment (lssacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, supra note 26, at 826 n.65; I find it instructive.
See also In Tf! Repetitive Stress Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing, via
mandamus, the consolidation of 44 repetitive stress claims and arguing that individual
distinctions overwhelmed common issues, but also noting that the appellate court "saw
nothing wrong with assigning" this set of cases "to a single district judge who may order
that particular proceedings or certain discovery requests" be handled co~unctively).
.. See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., No. 42,865 (La. Super. Ct., 18th Dist. Dec.
20, 1996) (approving a settlement on behalf of all persons purchasing certain GM pickup
trucks by a certain date) (opinion on fIle with author); In Ttl General Motors Pickup Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., MOL No. 961, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17510, at *2, *41 (E.D.
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States Supreme Court decision requiring that, as a matter of
constitutional law, class actions are only permissible if plaintiffs
can demonstrate their capacity at the outset to bring the aggre-
gate configuration to trial, a federal rule imposing those limita-
tions will not constrain state courts to whom class action practi-
tioners have turned and will tum. To the extent federal Rule 23
offers salutary protections to absentees/Ill it is unwise to drive
aggregate litigation away from its parameters.
Third, I am less convinced than some commentators that
individual class members are worse off under some of the litiga-
tion and settlement regimes than they would be in a world
without settlement classes. The key phrases in this sentence are
"some settlementi' and "worse off." I am not here making an argu-
ment that certain· recent settlements are wonderful nor about
comparative states of well-being, but. rather about comparative
states of misery. The single-file case processing system has not
served well the range of individuals who have suffered from the
ills imposed by asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and many other
products or toxic substances, nor has it responded to many
forms of injury that involve individually small-value claims but
cumulatively significant acts of wrongdoing. While some individu-
al plaintiffs may have obtained singular victories, a glorious re-
cord of the triumph of justice cannot be found across claimants
and groups. Susan Koniak, opponent of many class settlements,
uses the evocative phrase of a "widow weeping" 34 to signifY the
Pa. Nov. 25, 1996) (denying an injunction against the White litigation in Louisiana despite
the allegation that the Louisiana court had been presented with a proposed settlement
"little changed from the one previously ... rejected on appeal by the Third Circuit in In Ttl
General Motors Cmp. Pidl-Up Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3rd Cir.), em.
den~d, 116 S. Ct 88 (1995)," and also noting that "11 class action complaints [were] pend-
ing in state courts").
" As discussed infra, the issue of the degree to which Rule 23 so functions depends in
part on the role judges take in attempting to learn of and safeguard absentees' interests
and to control attorneys. Some commentators believe that Rule 23, as currently adminis-
tered, has failed to and cannot so function. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under
Cloak ofSettlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1056 (1996) (arguing that "lawyer abuse in class ac-
tions is rampant and that the current ~tem, far from keeping this abuse in check, is set
up to shield lawyers from the consequences of their misdeeds").
34 SuSan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Wulow Weeps: Georgine v. Arnchem Products, Inc.,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1995).
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individual injuries that go unredressed. My sense is that we
should all be "weeping" as we watch justice processes fail in
these categories of claims.
One example comes from the Dalkon Shield litigation: at the
time when A.H. Robins entered bankruptcy, between fifteen
thousand and thirty thousand tort claims had been filed.!15 Mter
the bankruptcy and an effort to notify potential claimants, some
three hundred thousand individuals filed claims, of which esti-
mates are that about two hundred thousand represented valid
injuries.36 The tort system's singularity may have enabled the
individuals who had the wherewithal to file - those first several
thousand - but did not well provide for tens of thousands of
others. Of course, once the unfiled claims are "invited" in, enor-
mous questions of distributional fairness arise, but closing one's
eyes to people waiting in the wings (many of whom may never
get to court) is not an appealing alternative.~7
In the debate about the desirability and utility of settlements
of classes, the assessment of the pros and cons varies depending
on what is offered by way of comparison. Is the assumption that,
in lieu of class-wide settlement, each member of a tort class
action would otherwise be equipped with a lawyer and proceed,
individually, to a judgment or settlement of significant sums? Or,
is the claim that, were plaintiffs to form that line of claimants,
the last in line would find no funds because the defendant(s)'
assets would have been depleted? Is the implicit or explicit base-
line that, absent a group-wide litigation, individuals will receive
no process and no compensation at all?!l8 What lies in between?
55 See gmeroJly Kenneth R Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust, 53 L &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 100 (Autumn, 1990) (stating that about 14,000 claims were disposed
of or pending); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY 11 (1991).
36 Feinberg, supra note 35, at 100, 101 n.55; Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Notificatitm Cam-
paigns in Mass Litigatitm: The Dalkon Shield Case, 13 JUSf. SYs. J. 220, 223 (1988).
" This problem is particularly acute in the large-scale products and toxic cases and less
difficult when the number of claimants is limited and the individuals more readily identifi-
able. See discussion infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
58 Here the ongoing debate about the HIV-hemophiliac litigation is illustrative. When
the proposed remedy of $100,000 per claimant is compared to single verdicts of millions,
the settlement looks very limited; when reference is made to those who have litigated and
lost, or long suffered but as yet have received no compensation, or to the question of gov-
ernment efforts to seek reimbursement for health care costs from those who do recoup,
the settlement looks preferable to waiting for remunerations that may neither come nor, if
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When are defendants' willingness to pay conflated with
defendants' ability to pay? And how do answers proffered to this
list of questions correspond to the landscape of cases actually
filed or processed as a group?
My co-panelists have greater confidence than I that they know
the terrain. Professor Issacharoff offers the example of the twen-
ty-four minute class action as if it were prototypical,S!! while Pro-
fessor Green relies on the illustration of one widow receiving
three million and another no recovery at all.40 In contrast, as I
look at these last several years of litigation in the arena of mass
torts, I am acutely aware of the dominance of specific cases that
comprise our shared referents but also of the existence of doz-
ens of cases unseen, proceeding in state or federal courts -
some formally as classes, others under the MDL nibric or in
other variations.
Further, I see important features that distinguish the cases,
not only as between tort and commercial litigation, between
high-stakes individual claims and low-stake claims, or as between
personal and property injuries, but also within such catego-
ries.41 For example, in products cases involving substances like
asbestos, the large number of claimants (not all identified) and
the problems of equity among claimants loom large. In contrast,
in certain medical products cases like the Shiley Heart Valve or
in certain mass disasters such as fires, a circumscribed number
of readily-identifiable injured claimants, many with attorneys
already retained, present a different mix of problems.42 And
paid, be protected from government collection efforts. See Van Ouch, supra note 31 (de-
scribing the obstacles to plaintiffs' success); Emily Swiatek, Jury Trial Puts National Class
Settlement in Different Light, IND. LAw., Apr. 2, 1997, at 6 (reporting on a $2 million verdict
for the death of a hemophiliac boy who had contacted AIDS). The district judge's decision
approving the settlement relied in part on the number of cases defendants had won, as
contrasted with the few plaintiff victories, such as in a case without issues of ·product iden-
tification" or statute of limitations. See In re Factor V111 or lX, Concentrate Blood Prods.
Litig., MDL-986, N.D. III. May 8, 1997, at 9 of the slip opinion.
.. Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, supra note 26, at 807.
.. Eric D. Green, Advancing IndividuallOghts Th7TJ'lJ.gh Group Justice, 30 U.C. DAVIS. L
REv. 791, 802-{l3 (1997).
41 See RAND's Class Action Study, supra note 20.
•t See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (discussing the
settlement of claims involving a limited number of individuals who had received the Shiley
Heart Valve and subsequent remedies of ·explantation: payments, and research); In re
Nineteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603
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consumer cases (ranging from contract to tort, some with small-
value claims but others involving larger injuries to personal
property) offer yet other variations on the theme. Moreover,
unmentioned in most of the current discussion of class actions
are civil rights lawsuits, a category dominant only three decades
ago. 4S
From the pieces of the landscape visible to me and from
those I know I can't see, I am neither prompted to celebrate
class actions as a triumph of "group justice" (to borrow Eric
Green's phrase44) nor to condemn them as inevitable sites of
either group or individual injustice. Instead, I proceed with a
strong sense of distress at the failures of civil processes in gener-
al and with only a bit of optimism about our collective interest
- let alone capacity - to respond.
Hence, I offer a first conclusion. Over the past three decades,
federal civil litigation has been increasingly organized around
efforts to obtain. dispositions without trial. The "value" of a case
is not only measured by what a trial could produce. To insist
that class actions - unlike the rest of civil litigation - may only
proceed as if trial were the expected mode of resolution is to
unduly burden this form of aggregate litigation. I therefore
oppose the blanket prohibition of what are called "settlement
class actions" because I believe that prohibition closes too many
doors. But the vivid examples that have troubled so many judg-
es, lawyers, and academics serve as more than a caution, requir-
ing reconsideration of the structure of class actions.
The question is how to reformat in an attempt to monitor
litigant, attorney, and judicial behaviors. When revising (via case
law interpretation or rulemaking), one should endeavor to make
class action and other large-scale litigation governed by an amal-
gam of procedural and ethical constraints and obligations im-
posed on both judges and lawyers. This effort would thus join
much of the past decade's revisions of procedural rules (includ-
ing not only Rule 11 but also Rule 16 and the Civil Justice Re-
(1st Cir. 1992) (detailing procedures used for some 2,000 plaintiffs and 200 defendants in
an MDL proceeding resulting from a fire in Puerto Rico).
" SeeJudith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, & Deborah Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggre-
gate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.V. L. REv. 296, 350-55 (1996) .
.. Green, supra note 40, at 791.
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form Act), in that all represent a melding of rules of ethics and
rules of practice in an effort to control not only process but also
professional behavior.45 While much discussion describes these
efforts as "case management," that phrase is something of a
misnomer, as so much of the goal is lawyer management.46 And,
in this context as in others involving strategic interaction, each
attempt to constrain begets innovative methods to avoid such
limits and concerns that the constraints themselves impose
costs.47
IV. ADDING OPTIONS AND VARYING STANDARDS: LmGATING
CLASSES, SE1TLING CLASSES, TRIAL CLASSES, AND
INCREASING SCRUTINY OF SETTLEMENTS
To refuse a per se prohibition on settlement classes is not to
argue that all settlement classes are desirable or even permissi-
ble. I think, rather, that rulemaking could reflect some of the
variety that comes under the current blanket phrase "settlement
classes" and should insist upon a distinction between the propri-
ety of certification of a class and the adequacy of any proposed
settlement. To help make distinctions among the kinds of settle-
ment classes, I want to thicken the vocabulary by describing
different kinds of class actions - specifically, "certify-to-settle
classes," "litigating classes," and "trial classes." These distinctions
~dd to the current differentiations among classes related to the
form of remedy sought (such as "injunctive" or "damage" class
actions) by referring to the relationship between the timing of a
request for class certification and the timing of a request for
approval of a class-wide settlement.
.. Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, supra note 43, at 389-91.
.. SeeJudith Resnik, Constraining Lawyers and.Judges: Refkctions on the Civil JILStice Refurm
Act, the CivilJury, Rulemaking, and Congressional Control of the Federal Judiciary (forthcoming,
U. AlABAMA L. REv. Symposium on Civil Justice Reform, 1997; USC Working Paper, 1997,
manuscript on file with the author).
47 See gmerally JAMES S. KAKAuK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURA A. HILL, DANIEL
MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOlAS M. PACE, & MARY E. VAlANA, JUST, SPEEDY, AND
INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CAsE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CML JUSTICE
REFORM ACT I(RAND, 1997) (reporting research of implementation of the CJRA and con-
cluding that it had "little effect on time to disposition, litigation costs, and attorneys' satis-
faction and views of the fairness of case management").
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As is detailed below, rules and doctrines should be plain that,
at whatever time a settlement is proposed, a series of issues
come to the fore; included are the extent of the information
provided participants in a settlement about the remedy to be
provided, whether claimants within a class are treated equally or
distinguished by criteria that are appropriate, the relationship
between compensation to claimants and to attorneys, the cost of
administering the remedy and how it is financed, the degree to
which opting out is either legally or practically feasible, and the
timing of the processes of informing the class and permitting
opt outs. Below, I offer details on what such a regime might
entail, whether developed by means of interpretation of Rule 23
as it is currently formulated or by means of revision of the text
and notes to that rule, or by legislation. Appended to this dis-
cussion is a rule-based formulation that Professor Jack Coffee
and I provided in January of 1997 to the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules.
A. Additional options: Settling Classes,
Litigating Classes, Trial Classes
1. Certify-t<Hietde Classes
This kind of class is what is currently termed the "settlement
class" because settlement negotiations and a proposed disposi-
tion predate the certification of a class. The certification is the
means by which to implement the settlement, rather than the
settlement emerging after a case has been filed and litigated for
some time; the existence of a class and of a settlement are
linked and interdependent. Because no defendant contests class
certification, the plaintiff has a lower burden and the court is
provided with no adversarially-based test of the propriety of class
litigation.48 Such proposals inspire the fear that no one (plain-
tiffs, defendants, or the court) is questioning the adequacy of
.. Even within this category, variations exist. For example, in "prefiling settlement
classes," the negotiations for settlement of the class predate the filing of a lawsuit. Another
variation is that, while a lawsuit may have been filed before a settlement is proposed, the
question of class certification has not been addressed by the court at the time a proposed
resolution is reached by plaintiff and defense attorneys. Thus the court is presented simul-
taneously with requests for two decisions: certification and approval of a settlement. A use-
ful shorthand to stress the simultaneous events may be "fiIing<ertitying-settling classes."
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representation or the quality of the outcomes. Instead, what is
known is that defendants' and plaintiffs' attorneys are enthusias-
tiC. 49
How com~on are these "certify-ta-settle" classes? The short
answer is that we don't know; in tenns of current empirical
infonnation, the FJC Class Action Study was limited to four feder-
al district courts in a specific time period. We do not know if
this set of 152 cases is in any way representative of class litiga-
tion as a whole, either then or now. Hence, with caveats galore,
I report infonnation that should not be read as descriptive of
the universe but only as one glimpse. Class certification was
limited (as compared to "unconditional" certifications) to settle-
ment in fIfty-nine of the 152 cases.50 Further, the dockets indi-
cated that in twenty-eight of those fIfty-nine settlement classes,
the requests for settlement and for certification were either flIed
concurrently or the settlement proposal predated the certifica-
tion request.51 Of twenty-eight certify-ta-settle cases, all settle-
ments were approved; in most of those (twenty-four of those
twenty-eight), settlements were approved without changes.52
2. Litigating Classes
I offer this nomenclature to capture a distinct set of cases in
which, at the time when a court is considering class certification,
questions are raised about the ability of the case to be tried as a
class. action. Often a defendant; opposing class certifIcation,
poses the question under current Rule 23 in tenns of challenges
that either the prerequisites of 23(a) have not been met or that
the proposed class cannot show that it can comply with 23(b)(3)
standards on management and superiority. Alternatively, judges
may raise the issue of the ability of plaintiffs' counsel to bring
the claims to trial as an aggregate. Occasionally, an objector
(sometimes competing to represent another class, other times
49 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wan: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995) (detailing some of the concerns about self-interest of lawyerS
and defendants).
50 FIC Class Action Study, supra note 21, at 112. These 59 cases represent 39% of the
group studied.
" Thus, these cases were 18% of the universe of 152. Id. at 112.
•• Ill. at 112-13 (eighty-six percent of the cases considered).
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pressing for single-case processing) may also protest and argue
that the proposed class cannot proceed to trial.
I believe that Rule 23 practice should develop to include a
self-conscious and limited certification of such "litigating classes."
Judges should certify classes for the pretrial process, including
discovery and settlement negotiations, and then reconsider the
certification if and as the case proceeds. In a sense, such class
certifications parallel the formation of an aggregate under the
MDL statute,5g which authorizes inter-district transfers of pend-
ing cases to enable collective treatment during the pretrial pro-
cess. While technically under MDL, each case remains officially
distinct and can be remanded for its own individual trial.·· In
practice, the cases are more often than not disposed of en mas-
se.54 Further, in such MDL cases, trial judges may appoint law-
yers to work as a "plaintiff steering committee" (PSC) and vest
them with authority to speak on behalf of the individual liti-
gants, even though such litigants also have individually-retained
plaintiffs' 'attorneys (IRPAs) who filed each individual case.55
"Litigating class actions" vary the idea of the MDL in two
respects - by permitting the case to proceed on behalf of ab-
sent members (Le., unfiled claims) and by creating a rule re-
gime that imposes obligations on judges and lawyers vis-a-vis
both the absentees and the individually-identifiable plaintiffs who
have filed their own cases. Adding this nomenclature highlights
the change in civil process with which I began; litigation, not
trial, is the focus of procedure. Labeling a set of class action
cases "litigating classes" also echoes a distinction now common
among lawyers, in which some are described as "litigators" (by
which is meant a lawyer whose practice consists primarily of
pretrial motions, discovery, and settlement efforts) and others
are described as "trial lawyers" (by which is meant a lawyer who
tries cases to judge or jury).
>3 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
54 See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", supra note 30, at 34-35 (from 1968-88. 18%
were remanded); see, e.g., In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI, MDL 875, 1996 WI..
539589 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996) (denying a motion to remand 2700 cases to 47 jurisdic-
tions in the MDL asbestos litigation, in part based on the view that "plaintiffs have made
great strides toward settlement of their cases") .
.. See Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, supra note 43, at 309-26 (discussing the different types
of lawyers and their roles).
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3. Trial Classes
This final set might also be described as "full certifications,"
in which, at the time of certification, a judge finds that the
proposed class has met all the requirements not only to proceed
through the pretrial process but also to proceed, if necessary,
through trial. Certification is likely contested, as may be a good
deal else about the litigation, and the question of settlement is
not linked to the certification process. Given that many class
actions (particularly in civil rights actions) involve bifurcation of
liability and remedy, settlement may even be proposed after a
part of the case is tried, raising (as we know from the case law)
yet other, complex questions about what was adjudicated, wh,at
was agreed to, and the remedial authority of a court.56
B. Constraining Settlement Negotiators
With this tripartite topology (certifying-to-settle classes, litigat-
ing classes, and trial classes), the basis for my objection to the
formulation of the Rule 23(b)(4) under consideration becomes
clear. That text adds another option, at the time of certification,
by instructing trial courts to consider proposals to certify classes
in which:
the parties to a settlement request certification under subdivi-
sion (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the re-
quirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for pur-
poses of trial.57
This language and particularly the phrase "the parties to a settle-
ment' suggest that the existence of a settlement class depends
upon pre-negotiation of a proposed settlement. It thus encourag-
es pre-filing and/or pre-certification negotiations of settlement
and the very behavior that is most problematic: inviting small
collectives of plaintiff and defendant lawyers - before a class
action has been filed or certified - to negotiate among them-
selves and to present the court with an agreement that could
56 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 769-93 (1989) (Stevens,j., dissenting); see also
the Prison litigation Reform Act, discussed supra note 14, appearing to require statements
about what would have been adjudicated as a prerequisite to the continuation of consent
decrees in certain prison cases.
57 Proposed Rule 23, supra note I, 167 F.RD. at 559.
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then bind absentees. Such negotiations would proceed without
any court determination that the lawyers proposing to act on
behalf of a group (and in fact negotiating for a group-wide, if
not "global," settlement) are in fact adequate representatives for
the class they plan to represent, without notice to anyone be-
yond a small group that negotiations have commenced and, in
many instances, without the development of sufficient informa-
tion by means of discovery to provide any means of appraising
the quality of the proposed resolution.
The invitation to engage in pre-eertification negotiations cre-
ates incentives for behavior that is the center of criticism of
settlement classes: the fear of collusive bargaining in which law-
yers profit to the detriment of class members.58 Once such
"deals" are made, those affected are presented with the choice
either of opting out (often impractical) or of accepting the
agreement. Reshaping the agreement, if it happens at all, tends
to be at the margins.
Instead of encouraging interactions among self-selected attor-
neys, I think judges should sort out the different kinds of classes
and promote those that maximize protection of absentees. The
rule and practice should require that proposed settlements of
class actions be negotiated in a manner that: (a) makes visible
the many different aspects of the alleged injuries suffered by
class members; (b) informs class members of the potential for
settlement as early as possible; (c) gives class members informa-
tion about those negotiating on their behalf; (d) puts responsi-
bility on the court for structuring means to enhance fairness
during the course of such negotiations; and (e) scrutinizes set-
tlements with special attention to the amount of litigation that
preceded them. Higher burdens of proof and persuasion should
be imposed on those litigants who seek court approval of "certi-
fying-to-settle classes." When certifying "litigating classes," notice
should be provided to class members of the possibility of pretri-
al disposition and thereby invite in an array of representatives.
.. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 49, at 1373-84; commentary provided by John Frank,
included in the Draft Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee (April 18-19, 1996), reprinted in
Proposed Rules: Amendments to Federal Rules, Amendment to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
931 F. Supp. CLV, CLXXXVlll (1996) (raising concerns about "sell-out settlements"), 167
F.R.D. at 552, 556.
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And, depending on the nature and kind of litigation that has
occurred prior to the proposed settlement, one can also vary
burdens of disclosure and of substantiation of the quality of a
proposed settlement, create opt out rights, or devise other
means by which to respond to objectors.
Of course, insisting on structure and adding participants to
negotiations are not necessarily the means by which to bring
conflicts to rapid conclusions. As Professors Sam Issacharoff,
Douglas Laycock, and Susan Sturm have discussed (in the con-
text of Martin v. Wilks 59) , the exclusion of certain groups from
participating in the underlying litigation enabled the parties
present to forge bargains unattractive to the nonparticipating
disputants.GO More recently, descriptions of efforts to settle the
tobacco litigation refer to the multitude of views presented by
state attorneys general, private lawyers, and industry members;
the lack of singular representatives makes agreement more diffi-
cult as different visions of proper resolutions are pressed.51 The
structure suggested above will thus slow and make more cumber-
some the process of agreement; more litigation than settlement
may result. But as Dennis Curtis, Deborah Hensler, and I have
argued, it is not the process that produces such complexity but
rather the underlying amalgam of interests, parties, and agen-
das.62
v. SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS
My concluding comments are about the difficulty of imple-
men~ng these suggestions. The problem that "settlement classes"
raises is an aspect of a larger problem: the quality of settlements
in. general and the propriety of the shift, over the past decades,
toward procedural processes aimed at the production of settle-
ment.
59 490 u.s. 755 (1989).
60 Samuel Issacharoff, When Substana Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the lOghts
of Vested Incumbents in CivillOghts Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 189, 241-47 (1992);
Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in TriJnteral Disputes. 78 IOWA L. REv. lOll, 1012-13
(1993); Susan P. Stunn, The Promise ofParticipation, 78 IOWA L. REv. 981 (1993); if. Owen
M. FISS, The AUure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REv. 965 (1993).
61 optimism Dims for Agreements Over Tobaao, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1997, at AI.
62 Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, supra note 43, at 399-401.
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While the fact of settlement is not necessarily proof of a desir-
able outcome (however measured), courts have relied on the
existence of a settlement in individual actions as a proxy for an
appropriate outcome. When praising settlement, commentators
and judges invoke the fact of consent, that disputants have them-
selves determined to abort the litigation in favor of whatever
agreement they have forged. Yet, we cannot rest comfortably
with the idea that such agreements are always celebrations of
justice. Compromises are borne not only from the current re-
gime that pushes for settlement but also from the many burdens
of litigation, including lawyers' fees and lawyers' pressures to
settle,611 and from disparities among litigants, some of whom are
risk-prone and some risk-averse, some one-shot players and oth-
ers repeat players.64 Settlement in group litigation is all the
more problematic. We know that it is lawyers who offer consent
on behalf of those they represent. We know that, in many kinds
of cases, lawyers are the largest stakeholders - with more riding
on costs and fees than any individual plaintiff (even one sustain-
ing massive injuries) will recoup. Further, we know that it is
meaningless to speak of the discipline of clients monitoring
attorneys when "the clients" number in the thousands.65
The current practice is largely to ignore the problem of settle-
ment in individual cases. Absent facially invalid agreements,
courts routinely enter proposed consent judgments as presented;
they have neither obligation nor permission in individual civil
litigation to scrutinize the adequacy of settlements.66 In a few
specialized civil litigation schemes,67 in criminal cases when
63 See, e.g., SANDRA M. GILRERT, WRONGFUL DEATH: A MEDICAL TRAGEDY (1995); Wil-
liam LF. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments ofPower. Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in
Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L REv. 1447 (1992) .
.. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: SjJeculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOc'v REv. 95 (1974); Stephen Shavell, Su.it, Settlement, and Trial: A Theureti£al
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation ofLegal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 55 (1982).
6> See Jonathan R Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff s Attorney's Role in Class Ac-
tion and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommend4tions for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 (1991); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.
REv. 1 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L REv. 1183
(1993).
56 SeeJudith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 8S-92.
•7 See, e.g., The Tunney Act, 15·U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994) (anti-trust litigation); see also
FED. R B.P. 3020 (bankruptcy).
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guilty pleas are entered,68 and in class actions,69 judges are giv-
en a different role and charged with some form of oversight.
Thus, in class actions, even after courts have certified plaintiff
class's lawyers as adequate representatives under Rule 23(a),
judges are obliged to oversee that representation at the time of
compromise or dismissal. Under Rule 23(e) and its interpreta-
tive case law, a class action cannot be settled without notice to
the class and a judicial statement of the "fairness," "adequacy,"
and "reasonableness" of its resolution.70
But we also know that the judge - under contemporary prac-
tice - is not the disengaged arbiter coming fresh to the ques-
tion of the quality of the outcome. Rather, the judge is often a
participant in framing both the conditions under which negotia-
tions have occurred and sometimes proposing terms for the
settlement itself.7J Cases refer to judges who, when reviewing
settlements, "suggest modifications" that become part of a settle-
ment subsequently approved.72
Whether such judicial engagement is beneficial to litigants is
the subject of debate; that the Rule 23 framework itself does not
always function to provide notice to absentees or much attention
to class-wide settlements is yet more disheartening. In the set of
class actions the FJC Class Action Study considered, notice of
proposed settlements was not provided to members in all cases,
the notices that were provided often lacked important informa-
tion and were jargon-filled, few objections were made, and few
changes in the settlements occurred."
.. FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(l)(B).
59 FED. R. Cw. P. 23(e).
7. See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION, THIRD
236-48 (1995).
7. Judge Jack Weinstein's role in the resolution of the Agent Orange litigation is often
used as illustrative (see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS
IN THE COURTS (1987)); Judge Robert Merhige took an active part in the Dalkon Shield
litigation (see SoBOL, supra note 35); and Judge Bob Parker's actions in die asbestos litiga-
tion are detailed in In re Asbestos Litigation and are the subject of one of the pending peti-
tions for certiorari, cited supra note 3.
n See, e.g., Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265, 1268 (Ala. 1995) (describing the trial
court's approval of a setdement ·so long as the parties agreed to certain court-imposed
modifications") .
73 fJC Class Action Study, supra note 21, at 146-51.
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In short, Judging consent" is a very difficult task.74 The pur-
pose of a settlement regime is to avoid conflict among dispu-
tants and imposition of rules by courts. Requiring the parties to
a settlement to describe the potential dispute that the settlement
is designed to resolve often results in formalistic exercises that
do not enlist exacting judicial scrutiny of the settlement agree-
ments championed by the participants. And lurking behind such
inquiries is the question of "what next?" If a court refuses to
enter a settlement, how does it make parties litigate a case they
wanted to settle?
What are the possible solutions to this problem? One option
is to preclude judicially-based settlement, period. As Judge Jerry
Smith has commented, "[t]he Judicial Branch can offer the trial
of lawsuits. It has no power or competence to do more."7~ The
view might be that courts should never add their imprimatur to
litigants' decisions to terminate lawsuits by means other than
adjudication, for courts can make no genuine assessment of the
quality of outcomes other than by means of ruling on disputed
claims.76 One might rewrite the Civil Justice Reform Act, re-
write Rule 16, Rule 68, local rules, and revise the guilty plea
practice - all to move settlement activity outside the judicial
ambit.77
Or, one might retreat more selectively, distinguishing between
two-party cases and aggregate cases. While sanctioning two-party
settlements7S on the grounds that they are founded in partici-
7. See Resnik, Judging Consent, supra note 66. See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The &uTe-
ment B/Q.ck &x, 75 BosrON U. L. REv. 1257 (1995) (discussing the difficulties of evaluating
settlements and the indeterminacy of most such inquiries).
7> In TI! Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 994 (Smith,]., dissenting) (quoting an earlier Fifth
Circuit reversal of what Judge Smith described as "Chief Judge Parker's certification of
another class action against Fibreboardft).
7. The practice of using courts to record settlements stemmed from an era when that
was one of the few modes of verifying documents and perhaps has outlived its rationale. See
Resnik,Judging Consent, supra note 66, at 50 (reviewing English practice).
77 Paul Carrington has argued that the proposal for rulemaking about settlement class-
es hceeds the authority of rulemakers under the Rules Enabling Act. Paul Carrington, The
Limits ofRulemaking (Dec. 18, 1996) (manuscript on file with author).
78 Multiple party litigation, even when only involving a few rather than thousands of
participants, begins to raise questions of the fairness to all participants. See, e.g., United
States v. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, 734 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Daniels, 821
F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1987) (both imposing a special obligation to inquire into voluntariness
when pleas are part of a "packageft agreement); United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657 (9th
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pation and consent, courts might decline to pennit settlements
in collective actions79 on the grounds that non-participants (ab-
sentees) can never be bound without their individual consent. A
strict version of this argument is that mechanisms for opting out
do not suffice to ensure genuine consent and participation, and
that opt in provisions should be required; a more forgiving stan-
,dard would rely on opt out provisions.so While one might fur-
ther attempt to impose such constraints in only one fonn of
aggregation - mass torts - one would have to be aware of the
"portability" of process, that procedures crafted with one set of
problems in mind are often generalized and applied to other
kinds of cases.8 ! Under such rules, the settlement activity thus
dislocated would likely not only be in mass torts, but also in
other aggregate cases, such as institutional refonn, civil rights,
and environmental litigation.82
Once again, the issues are whether and how group litigation
should be treated differently than individual actions. I do not
want so to burden aggregate litigation as to disable it, and I am
not optimistic about disabling some class actions while preserv-
ing the practice in other arenas. I am left, under the current
regime and lacking empirical infonnation to give me confidence
that I know the landscape, to urge less celebration of settlement
in general83 and even greater caution in the aggregate litigation
Cir. 1992) (discussing the legality of the practice of "package pleas" in which the govern-
ment conditions acceptance of one criminal defendant's guilty plea on the agreement of
other co-defendants to plead guilty) .
.,. The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides an example of efforts to limit settle-
ments, albeit for different reasons. See supra note 14.
so See lssacharoff, C/o.ss Action Conflicts, supra note 26, at 832 (recommending a "strong
presumption against any class seeking to be certified under 23(b)(1) as a mandatory class
action"). For suggestions that, in mass torts, administrative regimes (also possibly with opt
out provisions) could be more responsive to the problems, see Richard A. Nagareda, In the
Ajlermath of the Mass Turt Class Action, 85 GEO. LJ. 295, 367-68 (1996) (proposing that Con-
gress create a statute that permits agency action and that ton litigation be held "in abey-
ance pending agency action").
81 See Resnik, Procedural Innuvations, supra note 12, (describing how judges developed
procedures for large-scale litigation and then applied them to "ordinary" actions).
82 Moreover, conceptual appreciation for the role of groups may be shifting from an
appreciation of the utility of groups as rights-holders to a more individualistic regime. See,
e.g., James J. Brudney, &jlections on Group Action and the Law of the Wurkplace, 74 TEx. L.
REv. 1563 (1996) (arguing that what he terms "group action" is now devalued).
.. See Resnik, ~eJudgment~, supra note 7; Judith Resnik, Many DOOTS~ Closing DOOTS~
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. DISP. REli. 211 (1995).
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context. I am left as well with reliance on a regulatory regime,
implemented either by statutes or by trial judges scrutinized by
appellate courts. The purposes of such regulation would be to
impose a host of burdens on lawyers who propose to represent
aggregates or individuals within aggregates and on judges who
preside in such cases. And, I am left to criticize both the cur-
rent and the proposed revision of Ru1e 23,84 as well as the
MDL statute and many other forms of aggregation, none of
which detail either judicial or lawyer obligations at the time of
settlement. I suggest that more be said - again either by means
of rulemaking or by doctrine.
Judges shou1d be obliged to structure settlement negotiations
(ex ante) and to evaluate settlements (ex post) in all aggregates,
be they called class actions, MDLs, consolidations or whatever.
As Denny Curtis, Deborah Hensler, and I have suggested, judges
shou1d require the many lawyers within aggregates to participate
in negotiation processes to enable the diverse interests within
the group to be plain.55 And before judges approve agree-
ments, they must be provided with information about their fac-
ets. Specifically, the terms of settlements should include esti-
mates of what individual members of the class are likely to re-
ceive, when such remedies will be provided, and with what costs
for their distribution. If categories of class members are to be
treated differently, those disparities shou1d be plain to all pre-
sented with a proposed settlement, as shou1d be explanations for
the variations suggested. Further, participants shou1d be in-
formed of the fee and cost arrangements not only between
defense and plaintiffs, but among plaintiffs' lawyers, including
any objectors who enter the fray.86
Two issues require amplification. First, hearings on the quality
of settlement should not occur without sufficient time for notice
to be disseminated,57 for discovery (either of the underlying
.. Here specifically, the suggestion of altering Rule 23(e) by adding the requirement
that the trial court hold a hearing before compromise or dismissal. See Proposed Rule 23,
supra note I, 167 F.RD. at 560.
.. Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, supra note 43, at 391-96.
86 Some of these suggestions para1lel those ofJudge Schwarzer, who has suggested that
Rule 23(e) be amended to require exploration of these issues. See William W Schwarzer,
Settlement ofMass Tort CiJJss Actions: Order Out ofChLIos, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 837 (1995).
87 New technologies offer the possibility of notice programs to enable pre-5etdement
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case or of the decisionmaking that produced the proposed set-
tlement), and for the production of sufficient information for
the court and the class members. In some instances, objectors to
settlements have not been permitted to depose settlement pro-
ponents. Judges should not permit suspension of the discovery
system in the federal rules, and purported needs for "fast track"
treatment should be carefully scrutinized. Proponents of settle-
ment should be required to present data (obtained by sampling
or other techniques) on the kind of injuries suffered by the
class and on the distribution of such injuries. Moreover, ques-
tio~s of inter-elass equity should not be postponed to some
fictive later stage: disclosure of methods of allocation of funds
or other remedial forms must be provided prior to the approval
of a settlement.88
Second, as Dennis Curtis, Deborah Hensler, and I believe,89
too little attention has been paid to how attorneys and judges
distribute the costs of aggregation - both in terms of lawyers'
fees,oo the expenses (sometimes denominated "costs") charged
directly by lawyers to clients outside the fee,9) and the adminis-
participation and to make more successful posHettlement distribution of funds. See, e.g.,
Joseph M. Fisher, Internet Seen as Means ofProviding Legal Notice, NAT'L LJ., July II, 1996, at
C3.
88 One litigation raising such issues is a proposed "mandatory" settlement of a part of
the Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, now pending. See In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MOL. No. 1014 (E.D. Penn. 1997); Pretrial Order No. 724
(Preliminary Approval Order) (on file with the author) (ordering a fairness hearing on a
proposed mandatory class action and of a proposed settlement); the proposal did not in-
clude information on the amounts likely to be paid to individuals nor the sums for admin-
istrative or attorney fees. The fairness hearing began on April 23 and 24, 1997 and re-
sumed on May 19, 1997.
89 Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, supra note 43, at 321-26 (describing the creation of "ad
hoc law firms" when judges appoint a group of attorneys to work as members of a PSC).
90 For recent decisions addressing these issues, see Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 927 F. Supp.
1036, 1045 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (rebuffing a PSC's "crescendo of hyperbole" that its "fee
award is so low that it sounds 'a death knell to the expeditious resolution of 'complex
litigation"" and awarding $10.25 million plus expenses as well as the right to apply for
future fees); In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d
295 (1st Cir. 1995) (reversing a district court's decision to award 70% of an attorney fee
fund to PSC members and concluding that IRPAs and PSC members should each receive
50% of an attorney fee fund, but that all common benefit work, provided by any lawyer, be
paid out of the 50% paid to the PSC).
9. See, e.g., In re Sanjuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 1997),
pet. for reh'g pending (affirming in part an award of more than $10 million in expenses to a
PSC but requiring that the PSC remit more than $1 million in charges for an attorney de-
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trative expenses resulting from the fact of aggregation.92 In
some cases, in which layers of lawyers (individually-retained
plaintiffs' attorneys and lead counsel appointed by the court)
work, clients may find themselves paying two sets of "costs" as
well as paying fees to two sets of lawyers, those personally re-
tained and those designated by the court. The litigants, the
judges, and the public must understand more about these costs
before courts approve the settlements. In contrast, in some of
the current settlements, class members know nothing or little of
the terms - of recovery or costs and fees - to which they are
asked either to assent or to object.
In short, judges should scrutinize all proposed settlements of
aggregates, be they in classes long, recently, or concurrently
certified, or in consolidated or MDL proceedings. And, when
judges have little information about the underlying injuries or
distribution of harm, more information should be demanded as
a predicate to approval.
. But as I propose thickening information and process, let me
sound neither cheerful nor naive. Everyone is an interested
actor in this story - litigants, lawyers, guardians ad litem, spe-
cial masters, court-appointed experts, testifying witnesses, litigant
activist groups, objectors, judges. Not only do these participants
have specific stakes in particular cases, many are repeat players,
whose incentives are framed by events beyond the case at hand.
Yet to describe the participants as "interested" is not to con-
demn them all as either noxiously self-interested or enmeshed in
collusion. Rather, I think a good many judges, lawyers, and
other participants, in both state and federal courts, are strug-
gling with misery that they see around them and are trying, in a
world of second-best responses, to do something useful in the
face of huge problems.
Of course, some lawyers are making lots of money; some
defendants are seeking to protect themselves from liability and
scribed as an expert and for payment of photocopying at $.25 per page).
92 The case law is sparse; thus far, th~ district judge presiding has substantial discre-
tion. See, e.g., In TI! Three Additional Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litig., 93 F.3d I (lst Cir. 1996) (upholding a district court order requiring reim-
bursement of $41,500 by each of 13 insurance companies; despite the insurance
companies' success on summary judgment, the court concluded that they had benefitted
from a case management system including a document depository).
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avoid the expenditure of their own assets, and some settlements
are unwise and unjust. I am all for watching the money, for
figuring out ways to regulate both fees and costs, and for exact-
ing scrutiny of dealmaking. But the dislike of particular egre-
gious high visibility cases should not be the sole engine that
drives our processes. The landscape is richer than that, and I
know there is more to know about class actions than what news-
papers (themselves also with and responding to agendas95) re-
port. Some of the class-wide settlement efforts are borne from
deep distress at both the justice and the efficiency of the indi-
viduated regime, in which some litigants have lawyers and some
do not; some make it to court and others never file; some re-
ceive payment and others either lose or settle too quickly.
All of us who think about class actions or other forms of
aggregation must confront that aggregates range in size, in kinds
and values of claims, in dimensions of legal and factual com-
plexity not easily mapped in the current iterations; and more-
over the variations are always and unendingly changing. Whether
a critic or celebrant of any particular practice or set of practices,
all of us need attend to a phrase found in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in In re Asbestos, which describes one set of lawyers as
having an "inventory of some 45,000 present claims."94 The
first, obvious point is one of sheer wonder: What does it mean
for a law firm to have 45,000 clients? Surely whatever has been
meant by the attorney-client relationship is not captured in that
nexus. But before rebellion takes hold, consider also what would
happen to those forty-five thousand people were they not col-
lected in some kind of joint framework.
My point is not that In re Asbestos is a good or a bad settle-
ment; I don't know. My point is that - however we name it -
we must think about the group of individuals that comprise
those affected by that settlement - as a group. We have to wor-
'" See, e.g., Claudia MacLachlan, Meritless Class Suits: A New Focw, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 5,
1996, at A9 (describing the announcement by the Chrysler Corporation of a "clearing-
house" to "gather information on meritless [class action] suits and the lawyers who file
them") .
.. In ~AsbestosLitig., 90 F.3d 963, 971, ~h'gdenied 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), peti-
tion fur em. filed sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 65 U.S.L.W. 3611, No. 96-1379 (Feb. 27,
1997).
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ry about inter-elaimant equity, about current and future claim-
ants, and about a system that has yet to provide redress to so
many.95
One option is to revolt against the developments of the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century: to reject consent as the pre-
ferred mode of resolution, to insist on an adjudicatory regime,
to rewrite rules of procedure to revalorize adjudication and
trials, to create new court structures and new judges. While such
a project has my sympathies, I think it unlikely to happen soon.
And, in the interim, within the procedural world currently con-
structed - with its too few judges, too expensive lawyers, and
preferences for settlement - let class actions come within these
strictures and let us try to craft protections to mitigate against
the miseries.
95 At the AALS session in which Professors lssacharoff, Oakley, Green, and I first pre-
sented our comments, Professor Robert Bone commented on this aspect of the problem:
that the difficulty of assessing settlements stems in part from the need to ascertain what
trade-offs among class members are permissible. Association of American Law Schools
Section on Civil Procedure, Program ofJan. 6, 1997, transcript at 55 (on file with the U.c.
Davis Law Review). A predicate question, constantly haunting class settlements in which
liability is capped, is the issue of whether scarcity (a "limited fund") in fact exists or wheth-
er the cap is provided in exchange for settlement and a more rapid distribution than might
otherwise have occurred. Iii at 57-59. To the extent such deals are appropriate, the ability
to implement them - to distribute funds rapidly - becomes all the more salient.
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The Honorable Paul Niemeyer
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Room 740
101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Md. 21201
re: Additional Comments on
Proposed Changes to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23
Dear Judge Niemeyer:
You had asked us to provide you with joint commentary -
outlining our areas of agreement about settlement classes and
offering language for proposed changes to Rule 23 that take
into account our different concerns. Below, we do both. Please
note that we address here only the issue of settlement classes
and do not reiterate the concerns we have about the proposed
balancing test set forth in 23(b)(3)(f).
[This leller, sent by Professors Colfee and Resnik to the chair of the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Civil Rules. is reprinted with the permission of both authors.]
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Although we have somewhat divergent views about settlement
class actions, we in common recognize that there is a serious
potential for abuse associated with them (particularly in cases
involving future claims). At the same time, we do not believe a
broad prophylactic rule, prohibiting settlement classes when an
action cannot be certified for trial, is necessary. Thus, we offer
below a possible compromise that attempts to protect against
these abuses without adopting an overbroad prohibition.
At the outset, however, we should also note that we both
object strongly to the proposed fonnulation of 23(b)(4). The
text now states:
"the parties to a settlement request certification under sub-
division (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the
requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for
purposes of trial. n
The rule should not suggest that the possibility of a settlement
class depends upon the fact of pre-negotiation of a proposed
settlement, nor should the rule encourage the behavior that is
most problematic: inviting small collectives of plaintiff and de-
fendant lawyers - before a class action has been filed or certi-
fied - to negotiate among themselves and to present the court
with an agreement that could then bind absentees. Such negoti-
ations proceed without any court having detennined that the
lawyers acting are in fact adequate representatives for the class
they plan to represent, without notice to anyone beyond a small
group that negotiations have commenced, and in many instanc-
es, without the development of sufficient infonnation by means
of discovery.
Such an invitation creates incentives for behavior that is the
center of criticism of settlement classes: the fear of collusive
bargaining in which lawyers profit to the detriment of class
members or one set of claimants benefit to the detriment of co-
claimants. l Once such "deals" are made, those affected are pre-
sented with the choice either of opting out, which is often im-
I See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wa~: The Dilemma of the Mass Tart Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995).
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practical in practice, or of accepting the agreement. Reshaping
of such settlements, if it happens at all, tends to be at the mar-
gins.
Instead of encouraging interactions among self-selected attor-
neys, the rule should sort out the problems posed when certifi-
cations are presented jointly by attorneys for plaintiffs and de-
fendants. The rule should also address. the distinct question of
cases in which class status may be appropriate for the pretrial,
litigation and possibly settlement process, but it is not known, at
the time of certification, whether class certification is proper for
trial. Finally, the rule should require court scrutiny of all class
settlements to try to guard against abuses that have become
apparent, particularly in mass torts.
Below we provide proposed language. Our proposal entails
what we take to be. an intermediate approach; we do not ban
settlement classes in all forms but impose standards by which to
assess their propriety.
Two other introductory remarks are in order. First, some may
object that our rule places more burdens on negotiators of
proposed settlements than does the current draft. As was dis-
cussed at the hearings, because these proposals emphasize the
desirability of a broad array of participants, the development of
a comprehensive information base, and more exacting scrutiny
of proposed settlements, it may make more difficult the process
of achieving settlement in some cases. On the other hand, it will
also enable some settlements that might not have occurred and
make better (we hope) the quality of the settlements proposed.
Second, we have not provided what ail ideal, final drafted ver-
sion would contain. Our draft is meant to convey the concepts
and not to represent the final drafting language in which the
rule would be expressed. What this draft provides are the princi-
ples that are at the core of a revision that we can support.
THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE
Proposed 23(b)(4)
(4) the court finds that provisional certification under subdivi-
sion (b)(3) for the purposes of litigation or settlement would
constitute a fair and efficient method by which to advance the
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resolution of the dispute, and such certification is requested
either:
A) by the plaintiffs, who seek certification but are not able
to establish that they can meet all the requirements of
23(b)(3). When making such a provisional certification, the
court shall:
i. indicate that the proposed certification is conditional
and for litigating purposes only ("litigating certification");
ii. make specific findings as to which requirements of sub-
division (b) (3) it finds satisfied, unsatisfied, or to which it
reserves judgment;
iii. require that members be notified of the limitations
placed on the certification. Should defendants or class
members object, the court shall provide a hearing, after
notice, on the issue of the propriety of certification. Mter
such a hearing, the court may alter the certification
and/or appoint additional representatives, a guardian ad
litem, or employ other procedures to ensure that all inter-
ests within the class are adequately represented during the
litigation process.
iv. either upon motion of the parties or sua sponte, revisit
the certification and alter it, either by decertifying the
class, recertifying it under subdivision (b)(3) or (b)(4)(B),
or by creating subclasses for certification as it deems ap-
propriate; or,
B) jointly by one or more of the defendants to the action
and by a plaintiffs' steering committee, appointed by the
court, even though all of the requirements of subdivi-
sion (b)(3) might not be satisfied for the purpose of
trial. Before certifying such a provisional dass, the court
shall:
i. make specific findings as to whether each of the require-
ments of subdivision (B) (3) are satisfied;
ii. if one or more of the requirements of subdivision
(b)(3) are found not to be satisfied, determine whether
any discrete subcategory of class members would be likely
to obtain a superior result (via settlement, trial or other
form of disposition) in another available forum or pro-
ceeding (including actions pending or to be commenced
in the foreseeable future). In so determining, the court
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shall consider whether similarly situated individuals have
obtained superior results in the past in other proceedings;
whether individual or representative litigation in the future
in other proceedings constitutes a viable alternative for
most of the class or an identifiable subcategory thereof,
whether delay is likely to affect materially the effectiveness
or enforceability of any judgment or remedy, and other
factors (including the availability of counsel) bearing on
the ability of class members to receive just and fair treat~
ment. If the court determines, either before or after certifi~
cation, that one or more discrete subcategories of class
members would likely obtain or has obtained a superior
result in another forum or by means of another proce-
dure, the court shall exclude such subcategory from the
certified class; and
867
iii. determine and make specific findings as to whether a
need exists for subclasses,· special counsel, guardian ad
litem, or other additional procedures are needed, because
of the potential differential in impact of any proposed
settlement upon class members or because of the need for'
negotiation among subcategories as to the allocation of any
proposed settlements.
C) When considering the request to approve a class action
settlement, and whether the class is certified pursuant to
23(b)(3) or 23(b)(4), the court has fiduciary obligations to
protect the interests of absentees. Prior to approval of any
proposed settlement, the court shall require that the parties
requesting the settlement provide the court with detailed
information about:
i. the means by which the lawyers seeking to represent the
plaintiffs came to engage in negotiations with laWyers seek-
ing to represent defendants;
ii. the degree to which the proposed settlement treats all
members of the class equally or, if distinctions are made,
the bases on which such distinctions are claimed to be
proper;
iii. the means by which the remedial provisions shall be ac-
complished;
iv. why it is in the interest of the members of the pro-
posed class action to accept the proposed settlement in
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lieu of either individual litigation or other forms of aggre-
gate litigation, in either state or federal court or in an
administrative proceeding;
v. information, if available, about the amount of compensa-
tion, including costs and fees, provided to the attorneys
representing the class and the relationship between that
compensation and that received by class members;
vi. information about payment of fees or costs associated
with special counsel, guardians ad litem, court experts,
objectors, or others;
vii. information about the methods by which other lawyers,
if any represent individual class members, shall be compen-
sated (including fees and costs) and the amounts of such
compensation; and
viii. such other information as the court deems necessary
and appropriate.2
A PROPOSED ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Under this subdivision, a court may consider two kinds of
certification not provided for in 23 (b)(3) - certification of
classes in which, at the time of certification, it is not yet known
whether the case can proceed through all phases, and particular-
ly through trial as a class action ("litigation classes") and certifi-
cation of classes jointly requested by lawyers for plaintiffs and
defendants (and often, but not exclusively, including proposed
settlements as well).
The purpose of litigation classes is to enable an initial explo-
ration, on notice to affected parties, of the possibility of a
group-wide disposition, either through the pretrial process or via
settlement. Building on the model of the multi-litigation statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1407, a litigation class permits discovery and explora-
tion of settlement on a class wide basis, but only upon notice to
affected members and opponents. This rule revision is proposed
to complement the spirit of other rules involving parties, specifi-
cally Rules 19 and 24, which endeavor to enable participation of
2 The provisions we have proposed for 23(b)(4)(C) could alternatively be placed in
an expanded 23(e).
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litigants with somewhat divergent interests within a single lawsuit.
The rule revision is also designed to make the practice in class
actions accord with that in other aspects of civil litigation, name-
ly that few cases are in fact disposed of by trial but many pro-
ceed through pretrial litigation under the aegis of amended
Rule 16. The proposed amendment to Rule 23 places burdens
on judges to ensure that those affected by such litigation are
adequately represented throughout the pretrial process, and
further requires judges to revisit the question of certification
when appropriate.
The other kind of certification contemplated by the rule is
that requested jointly by plaintiff counsel, seeking to represent a
class, and one or more of defendant counsel, joining in that
application. A common form of such requests is that of the
settlement class, in which a certification of a class is a means to
implement a settlement but the findings in 23(b)(4)(B) should
be made whenever the court has reason to believe that the
requests for class certification and for approval of a settlement
are linked. Given contemporary concerns about such cases (see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wan: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995», the rule imposes higher
burdens on such joint certification requests, including that
courts determine whether subclasses should also be certified to
ensure that all of the interests of class members are adequately
represented within the litigation structure and that those affect-
ed either legally or practically by a judgment are eitller appro-
priately represented or beyond the scope of any proposed judg-
ment.
As used in subdivision 23(b)(4)(B), the term "superior result,"
achieved "via settlement, trial or other form of disposition,"
requires the court to consider more than a comparison of the
likely monetary results of the pending action as compared with
likely results in another forum (e.g., an individual action in state
or federal court, an administrative remedy, other forms of aggre-
gate litigation, formal or informal, in state or federal court). In
class actions involving monetary recoveries, the court should also
evaluate how proposed recoveries will be funded (including the
adequacy of insurance coverage) and whether relegating class
members to individual actions, to multi-district litigation, or to
other ~rocesses will give such class members viable remedies, if
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liability is established, against defendants who are likely to re-
main solvent in the foreseeable future. When evaluating non-
pecuniary aspects of proposed settlements, the court should
evaluate carefully the ~ctual utility of those proposals and the
means by which they will be provided to class members. IT the
court finds that identifiable groups of class members have a
viable and established remedy by means of processes other than
a settling on certification class, the court shall consider the
effect of divesting class members of such remedies by approving
of the proposed certification. In short, this comparative analysis
requires the court not only to consider the class and settlement
proposed simultaneously but the other options practically avail-
able to class members, the incentives of the litigants and their
attorneys to proceed by means of a class as compared to those
other ways, and the availability of counsel and of access to such
other fora. The question before the court is whether there are
better ways to respond to the alleged injuries of the plaintiffs
than by means of a settlement class action or whether, under
the particular circumstances of a specific case, such a certifica-
tion is appropriate. .
When certified under any provision of 23 (b), the provisions of
23(f) that permit discretionary appeals apply. Judges considering
certifying litigating classes may take into account the concerns
either that class certification inappropriately creates undue pres-
sures to settle or, alternatively, inappropriately undermines the
authority of the class representatives.
Classes certified for litigation and those certified at the behest
of both plaintiffs and defendants should be accompanied by
notice to class members, thereby enabling the development of
information relevant to the settlement negotiations and relevant
to the propriety of maintaining the class certification.
The proposed revision also provides for the appointment, by
the court, of more than one kind of representative or lead
counsel and the utilization of an array of lawyers and others to
ensure a process of litigation and negotiation that will, in tum,
facilitate the district judge's task in considering the adequacy of
proposed settlements, if any result, and will assist the judge in
the discharge of his/her fiduciary task of monitoring the class
representatives. "Judging" consent - evaluating the reasonable-
ness, adequacy, and fairness of an agreement - is a very diffi-
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cult task. See Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL
FORUM 43. The proposed language provides the framework by
which judges are to discharge their fiduciary obligations to the
absent members of the class. Because this proposal anticipates
that more lawyers may participate in the pretrial proceeding and
in the negotiations, judges should - in cases involving court-
awarded attorneys' fees and costs or when approving settlements
that provide for fees and costs - consider awarding or requir-
ing that attorneys' fees be paid to a wider array of lawyers than
those designated as attorneys for a class, those on a Plaintiffs'
Steering Committee, in other "lead counsel" positions. See Judith
Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, & Deborah R Hensler, Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 296 (1996). The new language expressly calls for
information to be provided to the court about the proposed
compensation, including costs and fees, for all lawyers, be they
class representatives, individually-retained attorneys, objectors, or
others.
While the standards for considering of settlements filed con-
current with requests for certification do not preclude so-called
"futures" classes per se, the standards require close scrutiny by
the court of the treatment of all segments of a class when settle-
ments are proposed.
The court should ensure an inclusive array of representatives
during the course of class action litigation but should also guard
against the risk that small segments of class members or their
attorneys might attempt to exert control over the shape of a
settlement in a fashion that proves detrimental to other, and
possibly, most, members of the class. The requirement of disclo-
sure of all fee and cost arrangements, including those among
plaintiffs' lawyers as well as between plaintiffs and defendants, is
aimed at enabling the court to assess the interests of all partici-
pants and the degree to which specially-identified participants
(lead counsel, PSC members, special counsel, objecting counsel,
defense counsel, etc.) represent the interests of the disputants.
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We have erred on the side of being comprehensive in terms
of our explanation, our draft, and our notes. We would be hap-
py to meet with you to discuss means by which we could shorten
these proposals or otherwise redraft them. We remain willing to
help the Advisory Committee in any way that is useful to you.
Thank you for consideration of these comments.
Sincerely,
Judith Resnik
Visiting Professor of Law, NYU School of Law
40 Washington Square South
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